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Making Enemies from Allies: How The Global AIDS Act Undermines
Partnerships to Combat AIDS and Sex Trafficking. By Lauren E. Baer.
In recent years, the United States has become a vocal opponent of the
global sex trade and has taken active measures to curb human trafficking. This
advocacy has manifested itself in speeches before the United Nations, direct
diplomacy, and most curiously, in a provision of the 2003 Global AIDS Act
requiring that organizations receiving AIDS funding from the U.S.
government adopt a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.
On its face, this policy would seem unobjectionable. Yet it has drawn the ire
of many groups opposed to the sex trade, resulting, most recently, in the filing
of First Amendment challenges to the Act by two prominent development
organizations: DKT International and the Alliance for an Open Society
International (AOSI). This Recent Development unpacks these lawsuits and
the motivations behind them, arguing that they reveal a fundamental flaw in
U.S. policy: the legislative provision designed to address the AIDS/sex
trafficking nexus alienates the very organizations that are natural and
necessary allies in combating the ills of, and interactions between, the AIDS
epidemic and the sex trade.
The Global Aids Act and the Anti-Prostitution Pledge: In 2003,
Congress passed the Global AIDS Act, legislation intended to signal U.S.
support for stopping the worldwide spread of HIV and AIDS. 1 To this end, the
legislation authorizes the disbursement of federal funds for U.S. and foreign
organizations committed to fighting the disease. As a caveat, however, the
legislation includes a mandate that "no funds made available to carry out th[e]
Act. . . be used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does
not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking." 2 This
mandate has come to be known as the pledge requirement. Initially, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) said that the pledge requirement could not be
applied against U.S. organizations due to First Amendment concerns.
However, in Seltember 2004, the DOJ reversed its opinion, spurring the DKT
and AOSI suits.
Pending Legal Challenges to the Pledge: On August 11, 2005, DKT
International filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
1. United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 22
U.S.C.A. § 7601 (2003).
2. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7631(f) (2003). The Act also includes a government funds restriction,
stipulating that "[n]o funds made available to carry out th[e] Act, or any amendment made by th[e] Act,
may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking." 22
U.S.C.A. § 7631(e) (2003). Section 7631(e) also stipulates that the Act does not "preclude the provision
to individuals of palliative care, treatment, or post-exposure pharmaceutical prophylaxis, and necessary
pharmaceuticals and commodities, including test kits, condoms, and, when proven effective,
microbicides." Notably, however, the legislation is mute on whether interactions with sex workers that
do not fall under these explicit exceptions might be construed as promoting or advocating prostitution.
3. USALD, Acquisition and Assistance Directive 05-04 (June 9, 2005).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31: 513
Columbia challenging the constitutionality of the pledge requirement. The
organization contends that the pledge requirement compels speech in
contravention of the First Amendment. On September 23, 2005 a similar
complaint was filed by AOSI and the Open Society Institute (OSI) in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York.4
The Plaintiffs have a sound basis for their First Amendment challenge,
as a line of Supreme Court cases supports the contention that the government
violates the First Amendment when it compels an organization to articulate a
particular viewpoint as a condition of government funding. However, the
compelled speech cases the plaintiffs rely upon offer more than a framework
for analyzing the likelihood that their lawsuits will succeed on the merits, for
the DKT and AOSI lawsuits differ from the compelled speech cases in a
fundamental way.
In each of the cited compelled speech cases, the plaintiffs were
ideologically opposed to the policy that they challenged.5 In contrast, DKT
and AOSI are the government's natural allies in fighting the spread of
HIV/AIDS and the exploitation of women. DKT International is a non-profit
organization based in Washington, D.C., managing contraceptive social
marketing programs for family planning and AIDS prevention in eleven
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 6 AOSI is a non-profit
organization established by OSI, the principal U.S. foundation of the
philanthropist George Soros. As part of their mission, both AOSI and OSI are
"committed to using their private funding to facilitate discussion among
public health experts, doctors, social service providers, advocates, government
officials and others regarding the most effective ways to fight the spread of
the [AIDS] epidemic in the populations at the highest risk for contracting
HIV/AIDS. ''7 Thus, both DKT and AOSI/OSI share the government's mission
of fighting HIV/AIDS.
4. Complaints and all legal briefs available at Brennan Center, Challenging the Global AIDS
Act's Anti-Prostitution Pledge Requirement, http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/pov/
npr_dkt_osi.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Brennan Center Pledge Website].
5. See, e.g., Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (challenging a policy
denying funding to legal services organizations that represented clients who sought to change welfare
policies; plaintiffs were lawyers employed by grantees wishing to represent such clients); Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (challenging a mandatory student activity fee;
plaintiffs were students opposed to the policies of some of the funded groups); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991) (challenging a U.S. Department of Health and Human Services regulation denying Title
X funds to programs that used abortion as a method of family planning; plaintiffs were Title X grantees
and doctors desiring to counsel patients about abortion); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (challenging an order by the Public Utilities Commission requiring utilities
to place the newsletter of a third party in its billing envelopes; plaintiff was a utility who disagreed with
the content of the newsletter); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (challenging a New Hampshire
statute making it a crime to obscure the words live free or die on a license plate; plaintiffs had covered
the motto because they found it repugnant to their moral and/or religious beliefs); W. Va. Bd. of Educ.
v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (challenging a West Virginia regulation requiring all students to salute
the flag; plaintiffs were Jehovah's Witnesses whose religion compels them not to salute the flag).
6. DKT International Website, www.dktintemational.org (last visited Apr, 27, 2006).
7. Complaint at 47-48, Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev.,
No. 05-cv-8209 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter AOSI Complaint].
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Likewise, neither DKT nor AOSI/OSI advocates prostitution or sex
trafficking. Instead, DKT and AOSI/OSI oppose the pledge requirement for
more nuanced policy reasons.
DKT has no policy on prostitution and does not wish to adopt one. . . . [A]s an
organization working to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, it strongly believes it can best
do that in the many countries in which it works by maintaining neutrality on the
controversial question of how to handle the complex problems that arise at the
intersection of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and prostitution.
8
In contrast, AOSI and OSI openly acknowledge the "harms that sex
work inflicts both on the individuals directly involved and to others in various
ways." 9 However, like DKT, they too wish to maintain an official position of
neutrality. "Both AOSI and OSI have, as their principles of governance, an
adherence to the principles of an open society, including opposition to
adopting any policy positions that would lead to the stigmatization of socially
marginalized groups. [They believe that] [aldopting a policy opposing sex
work violates this principle." 10 Further, the organizations contend that "in
order to stop the [AIDS] epidemic among sex workers it is necessary to
approach sex workers and other people at high risk for becoming infected with
HIV in a non-judgmental manner, in order to establish a trusting relationship
with them and engage them in needed HIV prevention efforts." n This
approach, they argue, is incompatible with an explicit, categorical policy that
they "oppose prostitution."'
12
It is evident, therefore, that DKT and AOSI/OSI are not opposed to the
Act's broad statutory purpose: fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS. Nor can they
be called proponents of prostitution and sex trafficking. Indeed, their
complaints evince a real concern for the ways that the AIDS epidemic may be
exacerbated by these practices and a desire to combat the disease in a manner
that recognizes the intersection between HIV/AIDS, the sex trade, and sex
work. Instead, DKT and AOSI/OSI's opposition to the Global AIDS Act lies
exclusively with the pledge requirement.
What the DKT and AOSI/OSI lawsuits reveal, therefore, is not simply a
government policy that may violate the Constitution, but also a policy that is
arguably inimical to its own stated goals. The pledge requirement alienates the
very organizations that would be the government's natural partners in the fight
against HIV/AIDS and, in particular, those organizations that may be best
equipped to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic at the crossroads of the sex
trade.
A Policy Critique of the Global AIDS Act: To date, critics of the Global
AIDS Act have lodged two sorts of complaints: counter-productivity
complaints and constitutional complaints.
8. Complaint at 23, DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., No. 05-01604 (D.D.C.
Aug. 11, 2005).
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On the one hand, public health experts who support the DKT and AOSI
lawsuits have argued that the pledge requirement and the government funds
restriction are counterproductive to the government's goal of combating
HIV/AIDS. 13 These critics point to research indicating that: (1) rates of
infection and transmission of HIV/AIDS are particularly high among sex
workers and (2) curbing rates of infection and transmission is best
accomplished by engaging with sex workers rather than condemning them.
Thus, this critique contends that preventing government funds from being
used to advocate for the legalization of prostitution and requiring
organizations to pledge their opposition to prostitution undermines the fight
against HIV/AIDS.
On the other hand, the legal academics behind the DKT and AOSI/OSI
lawsuits have lodged constitutional complaints against the Act, claiming, as
outlined above, that it violates the First Amendment. This critique strikes at
the Act's constitutionality, but not at its efficacy as means of fighting
HIV/AIDS.
The first critique highlights the fact that, as a matter of methodology, the
pledge requirement and government funds restriction may undermine the
broad statutory purpose of the Act: fighting HIV/AIDS. The second highlights
the fact that the pledge requirement may be unconstitutional. The critique I
add is distinguishable from both and is one of political process: whether
opposing prostitution is a best practice in the fight against AIDS, and whether
the pledge requirement is constitutional, the mere existence of the pledge
requirement alienates organizations that would otherwise be natural allies in
the implementation of the Act.' 4 By foisting a policy position--opposition of
prostitution-on groups that wish to remain neutral on the issue, the
government takes groups that are not proponents of ideas that the government
finds abhorrent-i.e., who do not themselves wish to promote prostitution-
and turns them against a policy that they could be instrumental in enacting.
The risk of losing important partners in the fight against AIDS is real. In
February 2005, thirteen charitable organizations-including such well-known
groups as the International Rescue Committee, Save the Children, and Care-
issued a critique of the pledge requirement, saying that it "greatly
undermines" AIDS prevention efforts. In May 2005, Brazil turned down
approximately $40 million in USAID funds because it refused to sign the anti-
13. See Brennan Center Pledge Website, supra note 4 (containing declarations in support of
DKT and AOSI).
14. It is also noteworthy that each of these critiques is interrelated. DKT and AOSI/OSI know
that reputable scientific evidence indicates that engaging with sex workers is essential to combating
HIV/AIDS and that condemning prostitution may be counterproductive to a strategy of engagement.
Indeed, their awareness of the counter-productivity critique informs and motivates their constitutional
challenge, and this challenge is what turns them from being allies to enemies in the government's fight
against HIV/AIDS.
15. Press Release, Brennan Center, Brennan Center Represents OSI/AOSI in Center's
Second Lawsuit Challenging Anti-prostitution Pledge Requirement on U.S. HIV/AIDS Funding, Sept.
23, 2005, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/releases_2005/pressrelease-
2005_0923.htm.
Recent Developments
prostitution pledge.' 6 That one of the most influential states in the developing
world and several of the world's most well-respected development
organizations would turn against this policy is a clear indication that the
pledge requirement threatens our nation's ability to retain allies in the war on
AIDS.
Policy Suggestions: In order to respond to the criticisms outlined above,
the United States must rethink its approach to dealing with the problems
presented by sex trafficking and prostitution in the context of the AIDS
epidemic. First, the pledge requirement should be excised from the Global
AIDS Act regardless of whether it is found to be unconstitutional. While the
current policy alienates ally organizations, allowing organizations to remain
neutral on the issue of prostitution will help the United States retain critical
allies in the fight against AIDS.
More broadly, the United States should adopt a policy that punishes
those who promote prostitution and sex trafficking, rather than those who
provide services to victims. In this vein, Congress should modify the Act so
that it denies funding to the former type of organization, rather than the latter.
Further, the government should increase the costs of participating in the sex
trade, both by more actively enforcing U.S. statutes that criminalize sex
trafficking and by assisting foreign governments in prosecuting sex traffickers
on their own territory. Finally, the United States should more actively promote
female education and empowerment abroad, as the ills of prostitution and sex
trafficking will be eliminated not when all U.S.-funded aid groups sign an
anti-prostitution pledge, but rather when the women of the developing world
have viable options outside of the sex trade.
A policy along these lines will be punitive towards the true enemies of
the U.S. government, not towards its crucial allies in the fight against
prostitution, sex trafficking, and HIV/AIDS.
16. Michael M. Phillips & Matt Moffet, Brazil Refuses U.S. AIDS Funds, Rejects Conditions,
WALL ST. J., May 2, 2005, at A3.
2006]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31: 513
Bridging the Divide? The European Court of First Instance Judgment in
GE/Honeywell. By George Stephanov Georgiev.
Commentators on both sides of the Atlantic were stunned when on July
3, 2001, the European Commission blocked the proposed merger between
General Electric (GE) and Honeywell.' The transaction-the largest industrial
merger to date-had received speedy approval from the Antitrust Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and its rejection marked the first time
the European regulatory body enjoined a U.S. merger despite U.S. approval.
The GE/Honeywell case brought into sharp focus the differences between the
antitrust laws of the two jurisdictions and called into question the
effectiveness of the transatlantic coordination efforts of the 1990s.
Both companies filed an action for annulment of the Commission's
decision before the European Court of First Instance (CFI). On December 14,
2005, it delivered a judgment upholding the prohibition of the merger, 3 while
also finding that parts of the Commission's analysis contained "manifest
error[s] of assessment." 4 This Recent Development examines the
GE/Honeywell judgment and evaluates its impact on European competition
law and on the alleged divide between U.S. and EU antitrust enforcement.
The 2001 Prohibition Decision: The Commission's reasoning was
largely based on three types of anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger:
horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate. A major concern was the combination
of GE's financial strength and the vertical integration of its aircraft
purchasing, financing, leasing, and engine production businesses with
Honeywell's leading position as a producer of corporate jet engines, avionics,
and non-avionics products. 5
After examining the horizontal overlaps, the Commission found that the
merger would strengthen GE's dominant position in the market for jet engines
for large commercial aircraft, and would lead to the creation of a dominant
position in the markets for corporate jet aircraft engines and for small marine
gas turbines.6 Furthermore, the Commission found that the merger would lead
to vertical integration in a number of markets, including those for avionics and
1. See, e.g., David S. Evans, The New Trustbusters: Brussels and Washington May Part
Ways, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2002, at 14.
2. Other high-stakes transactions in which the European Commission intervened include the
2000 MCI-WorldCom/Sprint proposed merger (the Commission adopted a pro forma prohibition
decision even though the companies had withdrawn their intention to merge; the DOJ also objected to
the transaction) and the 1997 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger (approved by the Commission but
only after the imposition of stringent behavioral remedies). See generally Barbara C. George et al.,
Increasing Extraterritorial Intrusion of European Union Authority into U.S. Business Mergers and
Competition Practices, 19 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 571 (2004).
3. Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. v. Comm'n, available at http://curia.eu.int/ (case not yet
reported) [hereinafter GE/Honeywell judgment]. The CFI also announced a judgment in the separate
appeal launched by Honeywell (Case T-209/01), which was dismissed on largely technical grounds.
4. ld. (H 312, 364, 426,473.
5. Dimitri Giotakos et al., General Electric/Honeywell-An Insight into the Commission's
Investigation and Decision, EC COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL., Oct. 2001, at 5.
6. Case COMP/M.2220, Gen. Elec./Honeywell, 2004 O.J. (L 48) 1, 9H 428-31, 435-37, 476-
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non-avionics products, engine starters, and power components, leading to
anticompetitive exclusionary effects on other firms.7
The most controversial aspect of the Commission's decision was its
extensive reliance on conglomerate effects theories, which generally posit that
a merger between firms that are not direct competitors and do not have
customer-supplier relationships could still be anticompetitive. The
Commission alleged that GE could leverage the strong supplier and buyer
relationships of its subsidiaries, GE Capital and GE Capital Aviation Services,
to attaina dominant position in the markets for avionics and non-avionics
products manufactured by Honeywell. Furthermore, the Commission alleged
that the combined entity would engage in bundling, offering lower prices for
bundled products and higher prices for stand-alone products, and would
thereby extend its dominant position across new markets and force out
competitors. 8 The Commission's analysis of these points was detailed and
highly technical, but it generated much criticism because Chicago School
economic analysis has called into question the validity of conglomerate
theories and led to much disagreement among scholars. 9 Although
conglomerate mergers were found in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
in the 1960s and 1970s,10 the theory has not been applied by U.S. courts in the
past twenty years. 1' Conglomerate mergers are also not treated as a serious
concern in the non-horizontal merger section of the U.S. Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines. 12
The Commission's analysis in GE/Honeywell and the outcome of the
case illuminated many of the differences between U.S. and EU antitrust laws
that had previously been underappreciated. As presciently noted by Professor
Eleanor Fox, the differences in the relevant statutes and the development of
the case law have led to four broad "fault lines" between Washington and
Brussels: (1) different notions of what constitutes "harm to competition," (2)
different burdens of proof in making or defending a case, (3) different
triggering points for government intervention in markets, and (4) different
presumptions about firm behavior.'3 Each of these "fault lines" was exposed
in this merger review. While the DOJ approved the merger largely because of
its promise to deliver lower prices to consumers in the short run, the European
Commission feared the "distortion of competition," whereby a dominant firm
might use market power to harm consumers in the long run. Moreover, once
the Commission showed that a distortion of competition could result, the
burden of justification fell upon GE and Honeywell. After they failed to offer
sufficient divestiture commitments, the Commission was able to enjoin the
7. Id. B 347-48, 419-27, 478-84.
8. Id. IN 342-458.
9. Eleanor Fox, U.S. and European Merger Policy---Fault Lines and Bridges: Mergers That
Create Incentives for Exclusionary Practices, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471,475 n.23 (2002).
10. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
11. Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade
Commission, 72 U. Cin. L. REv. 209, 218 (2005).
12. U.S. Department of Justice, 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29,
1984). Only Section 4 of these Guidelines, dealing with non-horizontal mergers, remains in effect.
13. Fox, supra note 9, at 474-75.
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merger without seeking court approval. In contrast, if the DOJ had wanted to
block the merger, it would have had to persuade a court that the transaction
would be anticompetitive.
Indicative of the different standards of proof, the Commission blocked
the merger because it concluded, on examining a "balance of probabilities,"
that it was more likely than not to be anticompetitive. 14 The U.S. analysis, on
the other hand, was restrained by the American preference for non-
intervention in markets and the general assumption that when a merger itself
is not price-raising, its prohibition will be. 15 Finally, U.S. regulators
concluded that the efficiencies realized through the vertical integration of GE
and Honeywell would cause their competitors to become more efficient in
turn (or be replaced by new market entrants), while the Commission's analysis
of vertical effects expressed a concern about competitors being driven out of
markets, to the detriment of competition.
The CFI Judgment: The appellate judgment, delivered on December
14, 2005, upheld the prohibition decision, but disagreed with the
Commission's analysis in several respects, and, incidentally, moved EU
merger law somewhat closer to that of the United States. The lengthy ruling
consisted of 735 numbered paragraphs and was issued by an extended five-
judge panel. 16 The court agreed with the Commission's analysis of the
merger's anticompetitive horizontal effects on the three markets discussed
above1 7 and concluded under the "independent pillars" theory that this was
sufficient for upholding the prohibition decision. 18 Significant for EU
competition law, the CFI held that the analysis of the competitive landscape in
markets, and hence the finding of firm dominance, is "part of a complex
economic assessment" to be performed by the Commission and is entitled to
deference. 19
The CFI delivered a mixed verdict on the Commission's analysis of
vertical effects. Many findings were endorsed, but the Commission was
admonished for not considering the deterrent effect of Article 82 EC,
concerning abuse of dominant position. The CFI noted that because
foreclosure through vertical integration could amount to an illegal abuse of
dominance, the new entity would have a strong disincentive to engage in it,
14. In the aftermath of Tetra Laval, discussed infra, this standard of proof is hotly debated.
The Commission has maintained, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) appears to have agreed, that
there is a symmetry between the standards for prohibiting and clearing a merger so that there is no
presumption that a given merger is or is not anti-competitive; and that consequently there is not a
presumption in favor of a "right to merge." See Gotz Drauz, Conglomerate and Vertical Mergers in
Light of the Tetra Judgment, EC COMPETION POL'Y NEWSL., Summer 2005, at 35; see also Peter
Oliver, The Standard of Review of Commission Merger Decisions: Life After Tetra Laval, in LIER
AMICORuM IN HONOUR OF SVEN NORBERG (Martin Johansson et al. eds., forthcoming 2006).
15. Fox, supra note 9, at 475.
16. The CFI judgment would be final in this case, since neither party exercised the right to
lodge an appeal before the ECJ within sixty days.
17. Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. v. Comm'n, available at http://curia.eu.int/, i 562-63, 583-84,
619-20 (case not yet reported).
18. Id T1 42-43. Under this theory, the appellant cannot prevail unless it brings an effective
challenge against each of the grounds for the Commission's decision.
19. Id. 1253.
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and this should have been considered.2° In so holding, the CFI echoed its 2002
judgment in the consequential Tetra Laval case.
21
The rejection of conglomerate effects theories dealt the most serious
blow to the Commission's analysis and will mark GE/Honeywell's
significance for EU competition law. Again relying in part on Tetra Laval, the
CFI held that the Commission had not established through "convincing
evidence" that the new entity would engage in exclusionary "bundling" and
"leveraging," or even that it would have an economic incentive to do so.2 2 The
court added that past commercial strategies cannot serve as the sole evidence
of prospective intent and that the Commission could have supported its claim
by finding internal documents "attesting to the settled intention" of GE to
engage in anticompetitive practices post-merger, or an economic assessment
showing that such behavior would have been in the company's commercial
23interests. This new standard does not preclude future reliance on
conglomerate effects, but the strength of the evidence now required to prove
such effects makes it less likely that the theory could be employed and
defended.
A Look to the Future: Even though the CFI upheld the Commission's
decision and reconfirmed that EU and U.S. antitrust laws can lead to
conflicting outcomes in large merger cases, GE/Honeywell might nevertheless
remain the sole instance of transatlantic antitrust divergence for some time to
come. Developments since 2001, some political but most institutional, have
made it unlikely that a similar case will follow in the near future. On the
political front, vocal criticisms of the decision 24 have had a sobering effect on
officials in both jurisdictions and have led them to intensify coordination
efforts 25 and place greater emphasis on negative comity. 26 For example, in
2004 the Commission exercised strong restraint and did not enjoin Oracle's
20. Id. (H 302-14.
21. Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4381. The CF found that the
Commission had erroneously enjoined the merger between Tetra Laval and Sidel because it had not
proven that the new entity would in fact act in an anticompetitive manner, even if it had the ability to do
so. The Commission cleared the merger and simultaneously appealed to the ECJ, which in 2005
affirmed the CFI's judgment. See Case C-12/03P, Comn'n v. Tetra Laval (Feb. 15, 2005) (not yet
reported).
22. Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. v. Comm'n, available at http://cuia.eu.int/, 328-64, 399-
473 (case not yet reported).
23. Id. 333.
24. For an overview of the exchanges among high-level officials in the United States and the
European Union leading up to and after the prohibition decision, see John DeQ. Briggs & Howard
Rosenblatt, A Bundle of Trouble: The Aftermath of GE/Honeywell, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 26, 27-30.
For examples of critical U.S. press commentary, see William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and
Range Effects: It's a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels, 10 GEO. MASONL. REv. 533, 534-35 nn.8-11
(2002).
25. See, e.g., U.S.-EU MERGER WORKING GROUP, BEST PRACTICES ON COOPERATION IN
MERGER INVESTIGATIONS (2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/international/
docs/200405.pdf.
26. In this context, the principle of negative comity usually requires one party to refrain from
enforcing its competition laws where such enforcement would unduly interfere with the legitimate
sovereign interests of another party. (It differs from positive comity which allows one jurisdiction to
request enforcement by the authorities of another.) The notion of negative comity is codified in Article
VI of the EC-U.S. Agreement on the Application of Their Competition Laws, 30 I.L.M. 1487, 1498-
1500 (1991).
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acquisition of PeopleSoft, 27 even though the DOJ had concluded that the
merger was anticompetitive and had tried (unsuccessfully) to block it in a U.S.
district court.
28
More important, however, a number of judicial and institutional changes
have occurred since the Commission's decision in GE/Honeywell. The 2002
CFI judgments against the Commission in Airtours, Schneider, and Tetra
29Laval substantially raised the evidentiary standards for enjoining a merger.
The Commission has also completed the long-planned "modernization" of its
antitrust enforcement, aimed at introducing stronger procedural guarantees
and legal certainty. The modernization program included a New Merger
Regulation, an accompanying Implementing Regulation, the Commission's
first Horizontal Merger Guidelines (akin to U.S. Guidelines in existence since
1982), and a document on Best Practices in the Conduct of Merger Control
Proceedings. Guidelines for vertical mergers are currently under preparation,
and comments are being solicited on a Staff Discussion Paper on the
application of Article 82, with a view towards placing greater emphasis on
economic effects in the assessment of anticompetitive behavior.30
Furthermore, the recent reorganization of the Competition Directorate
has introduced several internal check mechanisms. Special "scrutiny panels"
now vet all sensitive merger cases and a newly-appointed Chief Economist,
with a dedicated and independent team, consults on all cases. The specialized
Merger Taskforce of the GE/Honeywell era has been disbanded and integrated
into industry-specific directorates, and the role of the Hearing Officers,
charged with guaranteeing the procedural rights of parties under investigation,
has been strengthened.31 Each of these developments contributes to greater
certainty and, for the most part, greater convergence with U.S. antitrust
32enforcement practices.
Conclusion: The main significance of the CFI's judgment in
GE/Honeywell is its simultaneous affirmation of the Commission's
prohibition decision and its clarification of the treatment of conglomerate
mergers. By ruling that the Commission must prove through "convincing
evidence" that the new entity would engage in exclusionary practices due to
conglomerate effects, the CFI made it extremely difficult for such mergers to
27. Case COMP/M.3216, Oracle/PeopleSoft, 2005 O.J. (L 218) 6.
28. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The U.S. district
court's ruling against the DOJ was probably one significant factor in the Commission's decision not to
enjoin the transaction in the EU. In global merger cases, therefore, it might be preferable to have two
effective antitrust agencies seeking enforcement independently, rather than sharing the burden
informally. For one commentator's analysis, see Eleanor M. Fox, Remedies and the Courage of
Convictions in a Globalized World: How Globalization Corrupts Relief, 80 TuL. L. REV. 571 (2005).
29. See Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. H-2585; Case T-310/01, Schneider
Elec. v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-4071; Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Comm'n, 2002 ECR 11-4381. For
more on the standard of proof, see supra note 14.
30. Documents available at the EU Competition Website, http://www.eu.intlcomm/
competition/index-en.html (ast visited Apr. 28, 2006).
31. See generally Mario Monti, EU Competition Policy After May 2004, in 2003 ANNUAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 403-13 (Barry Hawk ed., 2004).
32. For speculation about the impact of procedures at the Competition Directorate in 2001 on
the outcome of GE/Honeywell, see Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro, Transatlantic Divergence in
GE/Honeywell: Causes and Lessons, ANTITRUST, Fall 2001, at 18.
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be blocked in the future. To the extent that conglomerate mergers are
generally not considered in violation of U.S. antitrust laws, this leads to
substantive convergence and helps to bridge the EU-U.S. antitrust divide.
Although convergence is helpful, harmonization should not become an
end in itself and should not occur at the expense of effective antitrust
enforcement in difficult cases. Transactions should be evaluated according to
the applicable antitrust laws, and merger clearance should not become yet
another tool of transatlantic economic diplomacy. The four underlying
differences between the competition laws of the two jurisdictions, discussed
above, remain largely in force. Recent decisions outside the merger area
confirm that different outcomes, whether or not acknowledged, will continue
to occur.3 3 In view of the politically charged nature of transnational antitrust
enforcement, the bigger lesson of GEIHoneywell is that future clashes should
be managed so that the discussion focuses on substance and moves beyond
unhelpful and oversimplified characterizations painting U.S. law as protecting
consumers and EU law as protecting only competitors.
33. For example, in the area of incentive agreements and fidelity rebates, compare the Second
Circuit's opinion in Virgin Atlantic v. British Airways, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding no antitrust
violation), with the CFI's judgment in British Airways v. Comm'n, Case T-219/99, 2003 E.C.R. 11-5917
(holding that the same fidelity rebates are illegal). The ongoing EU case against Microsoft, Case
COMP/37.792, is another example.
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Israel's Legal Obligations to Gaza After the Pullout. By Nicholas
Stephanopoulos.
The weeks leading up to September 12, 2005 were among the most
dramatic in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. After thirty-eight
years of occupation, thousands of Israeli settlers vacated the Gaza Strip, some
of them forcibly. Israel also withdrew all troops from Gaza, prompting a
"carnival of celebration" among the Palestinians who now would be
responsible for governing the territory.1
But while Israel is no longer responsible for the day-to-day
administration of Gaza, it retains a good deal of control over the territory. The
flow of people and goods into and out of Gaza is supervised by Israel, even
along the Gaza-Egypt border.2 Israel also controls the airspace above the
territory, patrols Gaza's coastline, bans the building of an airport or seaport,
collects customs for the territory, and maintains a population registry for all of
Gaza's residents. 3 Most intrusively, the Israeli military creates sonic booms in
the skies above Gaza, fires artillery at targets in northern Gaza, and carries out
targeted assassinations throughout the territory.
4
This set of facts-with no Israeli soldiers on Gaza soil but other means
of control remaining in place-generates an interesting and important legal
question: What exactly are Israel's obligations to Gaza in the wake of the
withdrawal of all Israeli settlers and troops? Israel has argued that thanks to its
pullout, it is no longer the occupying power in Gaza and thus has no legal
duties whatsoever.5 This Recent Development contends, to the contrary, that
Israel still occupies Gaza for two reasons: first, because it retains effective
control over the territory, and second, because agreements between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority (PA) prohibit unilateral changes to the legal status of
Gaza and the West Bank. Moreover, even if Gaza is no longer considered to
be occupied, Israel continues to bear legal obligations to the territory under
both international law and the Israel-PA accords.
The international law of occupation is set out in the 1907 Hague
Convention on the Laws of War (Hague Convention) and the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
1. Steven Erlanger, Gazans Revel as They Sift Through Ex-Settlements, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2005, at Al.
2. See The Disengagement Plan-General Outline, http://www.shanghi.mfa.gov.il/MFA/
Peace+Process/ Reference+DocumentsL/Disengagement+Plan+-+General+Outline.htm (Apr. 18, 2004).
3. See id.
4. See, e.g., Greg Myre, Israelis' Airstrikes Hit Gaza After Hamas Fires Rockets, N.Y.
TwEs, Sept. 25, 2005, at § 1, 8.
5. See Ariel Sharon, Address to United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Key+Speeches/PM+Sharon+addresses+
the+UN+General+Assembly+15-Sep-2005.htm (referring to "[tihe end of Israeli control over and
responsibility for the Gaza Strip"); Greg Myre, As Israelis Pull Out, the Question Lingers: Who'll
Control Gaza?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at § 1, 8 (quoting Daniel Taub, deputy legal adviser in
Israel's Foreign Ministry) ("The dismantling of the Israeli military government brings to an end Israeli
authority over the area and transfers its responsibility to the Palestinians.").
By "legal duties" I am referring only to the customary responsibilities of a government for the
territory that it administers. Even after the withdrawal, Israel does not argue that it is immune from all
legal actions initiated by Palestinians (e.g. tort or contract claims).
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(Fourth Geneva Convention). 6 According to the Hague Convention,
"[tierritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army," and "[t]he occupation extends only to the
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised."7
According to the Fourth Geneva Convention, occupation is linked "to the
extent that [a] Power exercises the functions of government in [the allegedly
occupied] territory."8 If a territory is found to be occupied, then a host of
responsibilities accrue to the occupying power, for instance, running schools,
providing food and medical supplies,9 and "ensur[ing], as far as possible,
public order and safety."
10
The status of Gaza after the Israeli withdrawal is open to some debate
under the Hague Convention's definition of occupation. On the one hand, the
lack of Israeli ground troops in Gaza suggests that the territory is no longer
"under the authority of the hostile army." More persuasively, however,
Israel's continuing military incursions and control of Gaza's borders indicate
that Israel is still exerting authority over the territory. Boots on the ground are
often a reasonable proxy for authority over a territory, but nothing in the
Hague Convention makes them a prerequisite for a finding of occupation."
The legal relationship under the Fourth Geneva Convention is clearer still.
Israel continues to carry out several core functions of government in Gaza-
for example, managing internal and external security, regulating the flow of
people and goods, collecting customs, etc.-and is to that extent still an
occupying power. Israel may have fewer obligations to Gaza now that its
troops and settlers have withdrawn, but it will not be completely free of
responsibilities until it allows the PA to exercise full control over the
territory.
1 2
Putting aside international law for the moment, there is a second reason
why Gaza must still be regarded as occupied territory even after the Israeli
pullout: the repeated pledges of both Israel and the PA not to alter unilaterally
the legal status of Gaza or the West Bank. Several interim agreements
6. The Hague Convention is generally considered to have become customary international
law. Israel is a signatory to the Fourth Geneva Convention, but there is some controversy over whether
the treaty applies to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel claims that it does not, but the majority view is
that it does. See David John Ball, Toss the Travaux: Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the
Middle East Conflict-A Modem (Re)assessment, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1009 (2004).
7. Annex to The Hague Convention on the Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land
art. 42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
8. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 6,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
9. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 8, arts. 47-78.
10. Hague Convention, supra note 7, art. 43.
11. The Nuremberg Tribunal after World War II notably took this position as well. See United
States v. Wilhelm, in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALs BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL CouNcn. ORDER No. 10, at 1230, 1243 (holding that Greece and Yugoslavia were
occupied even though "the partisans were able to control sections of these countries at various times"
because "it is established that the Germans could at any time they desired assume physical control of
any part of the country").
12. Occupation is thus a binary concept under the Hague Convention, but a more multifaceted
one under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Under the Hague Convention, a territory either is or is not
occupied, while under the Fourth Convention, degrees of occupation exist depending on the extent to
which the occupying power exercises functions of government.
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between Israel and the PA contain the following language or a close variant:
"Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status
negotiations."' 3 Before Israel's withdrawal, there was little dispute that Gaza
was occupied; a 2004 International Court of Justice advisory opinion even
stated that Gaza and the West Bank "were occupied by Israel in 1967 during
the armed conflict between Israel and Jordan," and that "[s]ubsequent events
in these territories . . . have done nothing to alter the situation."14 Now that
Israel has pulled out of Gaza, the territory must still be considered to be
occupied or else Israel will have effected the unilateral change in status
prohibited by the Israel-PA interim agreements. The Palestinians, of course,
have not consented to any alteration of Gaza's legal status, and oppose any
modifications to the status quo to which both sides have not agreed.
Israel might respond that the term "status" in the interim agreements
does not refer to whether a territory is occupied under international
humanitarian law, but rather only to whether a territory is formally under
Israeli or Palestinian sovereignty. Alternatively, Israel might claim that the
interim agreements sought only to ban self-serving unilateral shifts in status,
i.e., the annexation of land by Israel or a declaration of independence by the
PA. Both of these arguments are belied by the plain text of the agreements. On
its face, "status" includes within its scope whether a territory is occupied, and
does not hint at any asymmetry whereby certain changes in status would be
acceptable but others would not be. Moreover, turning to the drafting history
of the agreements, there is no evidence that Israel and the PA wished to
exclude international humanitarian law from the definition of "status," or to
establish an asymmetric policy on status change. As the weaker of the two
parties, the PA in particular might have been expected to oppose any such
asymmetry, in order to prevent precisely the situation that is now unfolding in
Gaza-the unilateral imposition of terms by Israel.
Therefore, under both international law and the Israel-PA interim
agreements, Gaza remains occupied territory in the wake of the Israeli
withdrawal. But even if Gaza is not considered to be occupied, Israel
continues to bear obligations to the territory pursuant to the same legal
documents that support Gaza's post-pullout occupied status. First, the Fourth
Geneva Convention imposes duties not only on occupying powers, but also on
treaty signatories whenever they are involved in armed conflict. Article 2
states that "the present Convention shall apply to all cases of . . . armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties," and that even if "one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to
13. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, lsr.-P.L.O.,
art. 31, Sept. 28, 1995, 37 I.L.M. 557, 568 [hereinafter Interim Agreement]; see also Wye River
Memorandum, Isr.-P.L.O., art. 5, Oct. 23, 1998, 37 LL.M. 1251, 1255 ("[N]either side shall initiate or
take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the
Interim Agreement."); Sharm EI-Sheikh Memorandum, Isr.-P.L.O., art. 8, Sept. 4, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1465,
1468 (same).
14. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
2004 I.C.J. 131, 1 78 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion]. Israel, it should be noted, sometimes
argues that Gaza and the West Bank are not occupied but rather disputed territories.
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the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto" shall "be bound
by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and
applies the provisions thereof."15
Both of these clauses indicate that Israel's relations with Gaza are still
governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention. "Armed conflict" continues in
Gaza in the form of Israeli military incursions and Palestinian rocket attacks
and suicide bombings. It is true that the PA is not-and, as an entity other
than a sovereign state, could not be-a "High Contracting Party" to the
Convention, but the Gaza conflict arose as a result of the 1967 war between
Israel and Egypt, both of which are signatories. In addition, the PA officially
"accepts and applies" the Fourth Geneva Convention, meaning that the treaty
is applicable even if one ignores Egypt's role in the hostilities. 16 The
obligations specified in the Convention for belligerents (as distinct from
occupying powers) are laid out in Articles 13-46, and include allowing the
free passage of food and medicine, permitting civilians to leave the zone of
conflict, and avoiding unnecessary physical suffering among civilians.
Israel also retains legal duties to Gaza, even if the territory is no longer
occupied, under the Israel-PA interim agreements. In those agreements, Israel
vowed, inter alia, to facilitate the "normal and smooth movement of people,
vehicles, and goods.., between the West Bank and Gaza Strip,"' 7 to exercise
its powers "with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles
of human rights and the rule of law,"1 8 and to cooperate with the PA in
dealing with areas such as agriculture, commerce, education, and
employment. 19 Crucially, none of these obligations hinges on whether Gaza is
occupied. The assumption of both Israel and the PA in drafting the agreements
was that "the West Bank and the Gaza Strip [are] a single territorial unit, the
integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period., 20
The Israeli obligations denoted in the agreements will therefore remain in
place until a permanent settlement regarding both Gaza and the West Bank is
achieved. Nothing in the agreements' texts suggests that the duties expire as
soon as Israel withdraws its settlers and troops from a particular parcel of
land.
To conclude, Israel has not yet succeeded in washing its hands of Gaza.
Whether or not Gaza is regarded as occupied in the wake of the Israeli pullout,
Israel continues to bear obligations to the territory under both international
humanitarian law and the Israel-PA interim agreements.
Israelis may consider this situation to be a bit unfair. After all, the
decision to withdraw from Gaza was a wrenching one for the country, and
may have been expected to shift the legal landscape at least a little. But there
is a common-and quite equitable-theme that underlies both the
15. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 8, art. 2.
16. See Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 14, 91.
17. Interim Agreement, supra note 13, Annex I: Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces and
Transfer of Responsibility art. 1.
18. Interim Agreement, supra note 13, art. 19.
19. Interim Agreement, supra note 13, Annex HI: Protocol Governing Civil Affairs art. 1.
20. Interim Agreement, supra note 13, art. 11.
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international law of occupation and the Israel-PA accords: the notion that no
party should profit from unilateral changes to the status quo. Under the Hague
Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention, nations incur the obligations
of occupation whenever they engage in warfare beyond their borders, and can
only shed these obligations if they halt the conflict, terminate military control
over the conquered territory, and stop carrying out the functions of
government in that zone. Under the Israel-PA interim agreements, similarly,
both sides agreed to treat Gaza and the West Bank as a unified entity, and to
make changes to the territories' status only by mutual consent. Israel's
position that it no longer owes anything to Gaza, then, squarely violates this
principle of not rewarding those who unilaterally shift the status quo.
Politically, the withdrawal may yet prove to be a masterstroke. Legally,
however, it has changed nothing.
